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qualia theorists (Sarıhan 2020). He argues that qualia theorists like 
Ned Block and Amy Kind who cite double-vision, afterimages, etc., as 
evidence for the existence of qualia are mistaken about the actual na-
ture of these states. According to Sarıhan, these authors confuse the fact 
that these states are non-endorsed representational states with the fact 
that they are at least partly non-representational. I argue that Sarıhan’s 
argument contains gaps that suggest that he misidentifi es the mistake 
that leads these qualia theorists to their conclusion. In my view, these 
qualia theorists do not confuse the fact that the states in question are 
non-endorsed states with the fact that they are non-representational, but 
rather mistake certain representational contents, or certain aspects of 
these contents, for qualia.
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1. Introduction
In his paper “Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-En-
dorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia,” 
Işık Sarıhan addresses the debate between strong representationalists 
and qualia theorists (Sarıhan 2020).1 Strong representationalists hold 
that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical with a cer-
1 Strong representationalists include, for example, Tye (1995), Dretske (1995), 
and Lycan (1996). Qualia theorists include, for example, Boghossian and Velleman 
(1989), Block (1996), and Kind (2008).
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tain type of non-conceptual representational content. As Sarıhan puts 
this: “Representationalism or intentionalism, in its stronger variety, is 
the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious ex-
perience are qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents 
the world to have” (Sarıhan 2020, 7). Qualia theorists hold that the 
phenomenal character of a perceptual experience outstrips its repre-
sentational content and, as a consequence, is at least partly constituted 
by qualia. Qualia, in the relevant sense, are non-representational and 
intrinsic properties of experiences. One important set of arguments in 
favor of qualia is based on the phenomenology of specifi c kinds of visual 
states, such as double-vision, afterimages, blurriness, and experiences 
of phosphenes. According to these arguments, introspection reveals 
that it is not possible to characterize the phenomenal character of these 
kinds of states exclusively in terms of their representational contents.
Focusing mainly on Block and Kind, Sarıhan aims to undermine 
the cogency of these arguments (Block 1995, Kind 2008).2 In particular, 
he argues that those authors who cite double-vision, afterimages, etc., 
as evidence for the existence of qualia are confused about the actual 
nature of these states. According to Sarıhan, these states are “fully 
representational,” that is, their phenomenal character is exhausted by 
their representational contents. Yet, the fact that these states have 
representational contents that are inconsistent with the typical behav-
ior of physical objects has the consequence that subjects do not endorse 
them at the cognitive level. Those authors who cite these states as evi-
dence for qualia therefore confuse the fact that they are non-endorsed 
representational states with the fact that they are at least partly non-
representational.3
In order to support this conclusion, Sarıhan argues for two main 
claims. The fi rst claim is that those states that are typically cited in 
support of qualia are fully representational states that automatically 
fail to be endorsed at the cognitive level. Call this the non-endorsement 
claim. The second claim is that authors who appeal to these kinds of 
states in order to argue for the existence of qualia confuse the fact that 
they are automatically non-endorsed representational states with the 
fact that they are non-representational. Call this the confusion claim. 
I fi nd the paper very interesting, and I very much enjoyed reading 
it and thinking about the issues raised in it. I agree with Sarıhan that 
the phenomenological considerations regarding double vision, afterim-
ages, etc. do not provide conclusive support for the existence of qualia. 
I also share Sarıhan’s strong representationalist leanings and believe 
that these kinds of visual states are fully representational. But I think 
that the main arguments for the non-endorsement claim and the con-
2 Sarıhan also considers the arguments put forward by Boghossian and Velleman 
(1989).
3 As Sarıhan puts it: “these authors themselves describe such states as if they 
were non-endorsed representations, before making the logically illegitimate move 
that they are non-representational” (Sarıhan 2020: 8).
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fusion claim contain gaps. These gaps suggest that Sarıhan misidenti-
fi es the mistake that leads qualia theorists to their conclusion. In my 
view, qualia theorists like Block and Kind do not confuse the fact that 
the states in question are non-endorsed states with the fact that they 
are non-representational, but rather mistake certain representational 
contents, or certain aspects of these contents, for qualia. As I will try 
to make clear throughout this paper, our disagreement is grounded in 
a fundamental difference in how we analyze the contents of the states 
in question.
I proceed as follows. In section 1, I focus on double vision to show 
that there is a gap in the argument for the non-endorsement claim. 
Analyzing this gap suggests that those states of double vision that are 
typically cited in favor of qualia are not accurately characterized as 
non-endorsed states. In section 2, I focus on afterimage experiences to 
argue that authors who cite these states in favor of qualia may not be 
confused in the way Sarıhan suggests. My discussion in this section 
also suggests that these authors accept a problematic premise, namely 
that we can experience visible properties only as instantiated either in 
material objects or in experiences. In section 3, I provide a sketch of a 
representationalist account of afterimage experiences in order to show 
why this assumption might be false. I propose that afterimage experi-
ences represent a special kind of object, namely what Martin has called 
a “pure visible” (Martin 2012).4 If this account is on the right track, it 
would support the conclusion that those authors who cite afterimage 
experiences as evidence for qualia mistake certain representational 
contents, namely certain pure visibila, for qualia.
Three brief comments. First, in this paper, I focus exclusively on 
Sarıhan’s most important examples, that is, on double vision and after-
images. I will not address other kinds of visual states, such as blurry 
vision and phosphenes. In my view, these kinds of states require sepa-
rate representationalist accounts. Second, the goal of section 3 is to 
sketch a representationalist account of afterimage experiences that, 
if correct, explains why Block and Kind mistake certain representa-
tional contents for qualia. I cannot give a full defense of this account 
in this paper, however. Third, qualia theorists are often motivated by 
theoretical rather than phenomenological considerations. However, in 
this paper I follow Sarıhan and focus exclusively on phenomenological 
considerations.
2. The argument in favor of the non-endorsement claim
The non-endorsement claim holds that experiences involving double 
vision, afterimages, blurriness, and the like, are automatically non-
endorsed mental states that are fully representational. This claim sub-
4 Phillips has developed a closely related proposal in great detail (Phillips 2013). 
He also argues that experiences of afterimages represent pure visibilia. But, as I will 
make clear later on, my proposal differs in some details from his.
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divides into two separate claims, namely (i) the claim that these kinds 
of states are fully representational.5 A fully representational state is 
one whose phenomenal character is exhausted by its representational 
content. And (ii) the claim that these kinds of states are automatically 
non-endorsed states.6 A non-endorsed state is a state whose represen-
tational content is not endorsed at the cognitive level, and the non-
endorsement is automatic if it is not a result of a conscious inference on 
the part of the subject.7
In order to support claim (i), the claim that these kinds of states are 
fully representational, Sarıhan considers a number of scenarios involv-
ing double vision, afterimages, phosphenes, and fl oaters. I will focus 
here on double vision. I will consider afterimages in the next section.8 
Sarıhan describes the following scenario. Suppose that you are stand-
ing on the roadside at night waiting for your bus after a party at which 
you had a bit too much to drink. As you look down the road, a motor-
bike approaches. However, since your eyes are a bit out of focus, due to 
the infl uence of alcohol, you see two headlights moving towards you in 
unison. Since it is entirely dark so that you do not see anything else in 
your visual fi eld, you do not notice that this is a case of double vision.9 
Consequently, you automatically endorse the content of this experience 
at the cognitive level and form the belief that a car is approaching.10 
Note, if it had been lighter outside, you would have noticed that the 
entire scene had doubled, which would have prevented your cognitive 
endorsement of its content.
If I understand Sarıhan correctly, we can state the argument for 
claim (i) as follows. In those cases in which the subject endorses the 
5 The argument for this claim remains somewhat implicit in the text. But I hope 
that my representation of it is fair.
6 Sarıhan defi nes a non-endorsed state as a state that has non-endorsed 
representational content. He writes: “A mental state has non-endorsed 
representational content if it has truth-evaluable content but the subject doesn’t 
take the content as true on a higher, cognitive level” (Sarıhan 2020: 11).
7 As Sarıhan puts this: “[A] non-endorsement of an automatic sort does not 
require conscious deliberation on the side of the subject regarding the illusoriness of 
the experience in question” (Sarıhan 2020: 14).
8 I believe that my conclusions can be extended to phosphenes and fl oaters.
9 I would like to point out that this scenario is somewhat problematic. The 
scenario’s purpose is to convince us that you have a non-veridical visual experience 
that represents two headlights moving towards you. But, since you are intoxicated, 
it is possible that you misinterpret the content of a veridical visual experience at 
the cognitive level. I describe later on in this paper how experiences of double vision 
may be veridical. For now, I would like to point out that it is possible to modify the 
scenario in a way that avoids the problem. Suppose, for example, that, unbeknownst 
to you, we anesthetize some of your ocular muscles, so that you see double. We also 
present you with a display containing one single dot that does not give you any 
indications that you see double. In this case, it is plausible to say that your visual 
experience represents one dot as two.
10 I simplifi ed here. You may fi rst have to endorse a more basic content, such as 
the content that two headlights move in unison towards you.
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content of a state of double vision like in the motorcycle example, we 
have no reasons to attribute to this state any non-representational as-
pects. We can explain the subject’s cognitive endorsement completely 
in terms of ordinary representational contents. Specifi cally, we can say 
that a state of double vision represents one thing, or one scene, as two. 
This is a non-veridical visual representation of the scene in front of the 
subject, but there is no need to appeal to non-representational aspects 
in order to account for its phenomenal character.11 If we assume fur-
ther that this holds for the contents of all states of double vision, it fol-
lows that we have no good reasons for saying that they involve qualia.
However, as it stands, the argument does not actually allow us to 
conclude that all states of double vision, including those that are usu-
ally cited in support of qualia, are fully representational. Even if states 
of the kind mentioned in the motorcycle example are fully representa-
tional, it is still possible that other states of double vision are not fully 
representational. In order to arrive at the conclusion that all states of 
double vision are fully representational, the argument needs an addi-
tional premise. Sarıhan needs to show that all states of double vision 
represent one thing, or one scene, as two. As far as I can see, Sarıhan 
does not state this premise explicitly and does not provide an argument 
for it. This is a gap in the argument because one might argue that those 
states that are usually cited in support of qualia do not represent one 
thing, or one scene, as two. Let me explain.
In the case of the motorbike example, it is plausible to say that your 
visual experience represents two headlights. Since there is only one 
headlight in front of you, your visual experience is non-veridical. In 
contrast, when you press against your eyeball, as Boghossian and Vel-
leman suggest, you see the entire scene before your eyes double. Yet, in 
this case, it is not clear that you see two scenes when you see the scene 
before your eyes double. In fact, Boghossian and Velleman deny this. 
Describing a case in which you press against your eyeball while looking 
at a line of text, they write that “you cannot even force the resulting 
experience into representing the existence of two lines, even if you try” 
(Boghossian and Velleman 1989: 87). Boghossian and Velleman do not 
ask you to convince yourself that you see two lines. Their target is not a 
cognitive state. Rather, they speak about the phenomenal character of 
the visual state. It does not look to you visually as if there are two lines 
on the paper. Since this is a plausible description of the phenomenology 
of afterimage experiences, we would need an argument for the claim 
that these states represent one thing, or one scene, as two.
 I now turn to the argument for claim (ii), that is, for the claim that 
states of double vision are automatically non-endorsed states. Let me 
fi rst say a bit more about the notions of cognitive endorsement and 
non-endorsement. I will focus on visual states. It seems to me that cog-
11 Incidentally, so Sarıhan, this might also explain why qualia theorists do not 
cite such scenarios as evidence for qualia.
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nitive endorsement is best understood as a dispositional notion, name-
ly as the disposition to form various beliefs regarding the contents of 
visual states.12 For example, when your visual state represents a blue 
cup in front of you, you will be disposed to endorse statements such as 
“This is a cup,” “This cup is blue,” and “The cup is right in front of me.” 
Moreover, this disposition is automatic if it does not require a conscious 
inference on your part. Automatic cognitive endorsement is defeasible. 
In the case of the Müller-Lyer Illusion, your visual state represents the 
two lines as being unequal in length. This does not change when you 
learn that they are equal. But you will no longer endorse the statement 
that they are unequal. Automatically non-endorsed visual states func-
tion in a different way. The representational contents of these states do 
not create the disposition to endorse statements about them in the fi rst 
place. The reason for this is that the contents manifestly confl ict with 
the behavior of physical objects.
Sarıhan’s argument for the non-endorsement claim now consists of 
a description of the contents of the relevant experiences of double vi-
sion that explains why they do not dispose their subjects to endorse 
them.13 He characterizes these contents as follows.14 Often times, when 
you see double, the entire scene doubles. Since the physical world does 
not suddenly double, you know that you are seeing double. Moreover, 
when you see double, solid, non-transparent physical objects are often 
superimposed on each other and appear semitransparent. But since 
solid, non-transparent physical objects cannot occupy the same space 
and do not suddenly become semitransparent, you know that you are 
seeing double. In general, the contents of those states of double vision 
that are usually cited in favor of qualia confl ict with our knowledge 
about the behavior of physical objects and this explains why we do not 
endorse them at the cognitive level.
In order to bring out my worries about this argument, it will be 
helpful to consider again how Boghossian and Velleman describe dou-
ble vision. I already addressed cases in which you see double when you 
press against your eyeball. If Boghossian and Velleman are right, you 
see one line double without, however, seeing two lines. It is therefore 
plausible that the contents of these states are accurate and dispose 
you to endorse them at the cognitive level. But Boghossian and Velle-
man also consider more ordinary cases. They write, “Similarly, you can 
see nearby objects double by focusing on distant objects behind them, 
12 Sarıhan speaks of a belief-inducing function of visual states (Sarıhan 2020: 
8). In my view, this is best understood as the disposition to form beliefs about the 
content.
13 We can also understand this argument as an inference to the best explanation. 
Representationalists can give a better explanation than qualia theorists for why we 
do not endorse these kinds of states.
14 According to Sarıhan, this should be taken as speculative psychology. Sarıhan 
leaves open the possibility that empirical research might lead to a different analysis 
of the contents of experiences of double vision (Sarıhan 2020: 14).
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and yet you cannot get yourself to see the number of nearby objects as 
doubling” (1989: 94). Here, too, it is plausible that the contents of these 
states are accurate and dispose you to endorse them at the cognitive 
level. The following example makes this clearer.
Suppose you are walking through a forest. As you look around, you 
focus on trees at varying distances. Now suppose you fi rst look at one 
particular tree that is very close to you and then focus on a tree in 
roughly the same direction that is farther away. When you do this, you 
see the tree that is closer to you double, but you do not see two trees. 
The same holds for the trees in its vicinity. Imagine the opposite were 
true. We would have to accept that your visual state represents differ-
ent numbers of trees when you refocus your eyes. Since this is highly 
implausible from a phenomenological point of view, we should charac-
terize the contents of this state in the way suggested by Boghossian 
and Velleman. Your visual state represents trees at different distances. 
When you focus on trees that are farther away, you see the ones that 
are closer to you double without, however, seeing them as doubling in 
number. Since you have two eyes that are some distance apart from 
each other, this is as it should be. In other words, you enjoy an accurate 
experience of the trees in front of you. Based on this visual experience, 
you will be disposed to endorse a host of statements, such as the state-
ment that there are trees in front of you, that there are so and so many 
trees in front of you (if the number is relatively small), and so on.
If what I have said in the previous paragraph is correct, we have 
good reasons for thinking that the states of double vision cited by Bog-
hossian and Velleman function in an entirely ordinary way. They have 
accurate contents that are usually endorsed at the cognitive level. 
These visual states are not automatically non-endorsed states. I would 
therefore conclude that it is not the case that, as Sarıhan claims, “the 
phenomenology described by Boghossian and Velleman above is bet-
ter analyzed as a case of non-endorsed representation of doubleness” 
(Sarıhan 2020: 16). Boghossian and Velleman do not confuse the fact 
that these states are non-endorsed with the fact that they are non-rep-
resentational. In order to convince us otherwise, Sarıhan would have 
to close the gap in the argument for claim (i) and show that all states of 
double vision represent one thing, or one scene, as two.15 I will present 
a similar argument about afterimage experiences in the next section.
In spite of my criticism of the arguments in favor of the non-en-
dorsement claim, I do not think that Boghossian and Velleman have 
made a conclusive case for qualia in the cited paper. My argument so 
far suggests that we need to distinguish between two kinds of states 
of double vision. The fi rst kind is illustrated by the scenario with the 
motorbike. In cases like this, I agree with Sarıhan that you have an 
15 Alternatively, Sarıhan could give a different argument for the claim that 
those states of double vision that are typically cited in favor of qualia are fully 
representational.
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inaccurate visual experience of two objects. The second kind is illus-
trated by the forest example. In these cases, you enjoy an accurate vi-
sual experience. In the fi rst scenario, you are not visually aware that 
you see double. In the second scenario, in contrast, it is phenomenally 
manifest to you that your experience involves double vision. Represen-
tationalists therefore have to identify those aspects of visual contents 
that make it manifest to you that you are seeing double without seeing 
two objects or scenes. Since a number of representationalists have pro-
vided plausible accounts of this, Boghossian and Velleman would have 
to exclude these options in order to make a convincing case for qualia.16 
3. The argument in favor of the confusion claim
The confusion claim holds that Block and Kind confuse the fact that 
those states that are usually cited in support of qualia are automati-
cally non-endorsed states with the fact that they are non-representa-
tional. In this section, I will address afterimages in order to argue that 
Block and Kind may not be confused about this.
Let me fi rst quote the relevant passages from Block and Kind. Block 
writes: “[Afterimages] don’t look as if they are really objects or as if 
they are really red. They ... look illusory” (Block 1996: 32; ellipsis in the 
original). And Kind writes: “But in none of these cases does it seem as 
if the afterimage represents something that is really there. When you 
close your eyes after looking at the bright light, for example, you don’t 
take the lingering glow to be on the inner surface of your eyelids. When 
you see the red afterimage against a white wall, you don’t take the 
redness to suggest the existence of a red dot on the page” (Kind 2008: 
289). As you can see from these quotes, Block and Kind both describe 
afterimage experiences as illusory.
If I understand Sarıhan correctly, he analyzes the mistake in Block 
and Kind’s reasoning as follows. Block and Kind describe afterimage 
experiences, using representational language. At the same time, they 
notice that the objects and properties referred to by these terms do not 
actually exist in the physical world. Consequently, they do not endorse 
the claim that these experiences represent material objects. But Block 
and Kind do not realize that the non-endorsement is a cognitive judg-
ment and mistake it for a specifi c phenomenal feature of afterimage 
experiences, namely a feature that belongs exclusively to qualia. Ac-
cording to Sarıhan, Block and Kind thus confuse the fact that experi-
ences of afterimages are non-endorsed states with the fact that they 
are non-representational. As I stated above, I agree with Sarıhan that 
Block and Kind make a mistake. But I do not think that they are con-
fused in exactly the way described here. I will make two points in sup-
port of this.
16 One such account can be found in Tye (2000). I also think that the account of 
perceptual content in Lycan (1995) can be extended to double vision.
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My fi rst point concerns the conclusion that Block and Kind confuse 
the fact that experiences of afterimages are non-endorsed states with 
the fact that they are non-representational. I have already argued in 
the previous section that states of double vision may not be accurately 
described as non-endorsed visual states. I think the same may be true 
for experiences of afterimages. A plausible way to interpret Block and 
Kind is as saying that afterimage experiences do not purport to repre-
sent material objects and their properties.17 As Boghossian and Vel-
leman put it, “afterimages are not seen as material objects, any more 
than, say ringing in one’s ears is heard as real noise” (Boghossian and 
Velleman 1989: 87). Under certain circumstances, we may mistake af-
terimages for real objects. Schroer, for example, reports an afterimage 
caused by a lightbulb, which “he immediately took . . . to be a red bean-
bag” (2004: 543). Schroer may have had a temporary non-veridical ex-
perience of a red beanbag. However, it is plausible that genuine experi-
ences of afterimages are not like that, that is, that they do not purport 
to represent material objects. If genuine afterimage experiences mani-
festly do not represent material objects, their contents can be accurate 
and dispose their subjects to endorse them at the cognitive level. This 
will happen if afterimage experiences represent their objects as what 
they are, namely as visual disturbances. I will elaborate on this in the 
next section. If this is correct, Block and Kind are not confused about 
the fact that afterimage experiences are non-endorsed visual states.
My second point concerns the representational language. In the 
passage quoted above, Block describes afterimages as looking as if they 
are not really red. According to Sarıhan, the most plausible way to 
interpret this is to take it to mean that something, some represented 
object, does not really look red. Similarly, Block describes afterimages 
as looking illusory. The most straightforward interpretation of this is 
to take it as saying that there is some brute feature of “unrealness” or 
“illusoriness” attached to the visually represented objects or properties, 
and this, so Sarıhan, is best understood as saying that the experience 
represents some object or some property as being unreal or illusory. 
Third, according to Sarıhan, it is also possible that Block means that 
something looks illusory in the sense that it is represented in a way 
that makes it unlikely that it exists. Similarly, Kind talks about a “lin-
gering glow” and a “red dot,” terms that are most plausibly interpreted 
as referring to representational contents. On all these interpretations, 
Block and Kind describe experiences of afterimages as representation-
al states. But, so Sarıhan, this is inconsistent with their overall aim to 
argue in favor of qualia.
According to Sarıhan, one might interpret Block and Kind also in 
a different, more charitable, way. One might argue that they use rep-
resentational language in order to refer to qualia, that is, to intrinsic, 
17 Phillips agrees with this. He writes, for example, “[A]fterimages simply do not 
appear to be material objects” (Phillips 2013: 425).
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non-representational features of experiences. One could then say that 
Block and Kind hold that an afterimage is simply a complex of qualia. 
However, according to Sarıhan, this interpretation “has no appeal for 
people who, introspecting an afterimage experience, fi nd no qualities 
other than those like colors that objects appear to have also in uncon-
troversially representational experiences, which makes it natural to 
think of afterimages as a special type of misrepresentation” (Sarıhan 
2020: 25).
I fi nd these observations about the use of representational lan-
guage important. But I do not think that these observations clearly 
show that Block and Kind are confused about the intended referents 
of their terms. It seems plausible to me that they use representational 
language intentionally with the aim of describing intrinsic, non-repre-
sentational aspects of experiences. Sarıhan correctly concludes that the 
phenomenological descriptions provided by Block and Kind may not 
convince those who do not fi nd qualia when they introspect their own 
afterimage experiences. But the question at this point is whether Block 
and Kind are confused about the intended referents of these terms, 
and, as far as I can see, this may not be the case. 
Sarıhan comes back to the more charitable interpretation of Block 
and Kind’s use of representational language again towards the end of 
his paper. He considers the possibility of translating their descriptions 
into qualia theoretic terminology. He suggests, for example, that qua-
lia theorists might use the term “red-quale” not in order to say that 
some object, a quale, is red, or that the quale represents redness, but 
rather to talk about the quale that we normally fi nd in experiences that 
represent redness. Similarly, he suggests that qualia theorists might 
use the phrase “experiencing an afterimage” in a non-representational 
sense that would be similar to saying that we experience joy (Sarıhan 
2020: 18). A successful translation of the entire representational lan-
guage into qualia theoretic terminology would lend signifi cant strength 
to Block and Kind’s argument.
Sarıhan raises two problems for this interpretation, however. First, 
he argues that it is not plausible that we will be able to give a satis-
factory translation of the complete description of these experiences. He 
points out, for example, that it is not very plausible to translate Kind’s 
references to spatial relations, such as her claim that the afterimage is 
in front of the photographer’s face, into qualia theoretic terminology. 
Second, he argues that there is no apparent reason for why we should 
translate the representational language into a qualia-theoretical vo-
cabulary, since “we have a simpler analysis which treats these states 
as illusions of an automatically non-endorsed sort” (Sarıhan 2020, 30). 
I agree that it is implausible that qualia theorists will be able to give a 
satisfactory translation. I also agree that it is more plausible to take the 
descriptions at face value, that is, as a characterization of representa-
tional contents. But, if what I have said above is correct, these descrip-
tions do not imply that afterimage experiences are non-endorsed states.
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In my view, the most important problem with Block and Kind’s ar-
gument is that they make use of an implicit assumption that is plau-
sibly false. As I said above, we can interpret Block and Kind as saying 
that afterimage experiences do not represent colors and shapes as in-
stantiated in material objects. Yet, the conclusion that these colors and 
shapes are therefore properties of experiences follows only if we also 
assume that viewers can experience visual properties only as instanti-
ated either in material objects or in experiences.18 In the next section, 
I will present a representationalist account of afterimage experiences 
that shows that there is an alternative. The representationalist can 
argue that afterimage experiences represent the colors and shapes as 
instantiated in pure visibilia.
Before moving on to the next section, I would like to summarize my 
argument so far. In section 1, I argued that there is a gap in the argu-
ment for the non-endorsement claim. What we would need is an argu-
ment for the claim that all states of double vision represent one thing, 
or one scene, as two. Absent such an argument, Block and Kind might 
still insist that the phenomenal character of genuine states of double 
vision outstrips their representational contents. In section 2, I made a 
parallel point about experiences of afterimages. Absent further argu-
ment, it is possible that the phenomenal character of genuine experi-
ences of afterimages outstrips their representational content. In both 
sections, I also argued that these kinds of states might be accurate. 
If this is correct, Block and Kind do not confuse non-endorsed states 
with non-representational states. In order to fortify his arguments for 
the non-endorsement claim and the confusion claim, Sarıhan would 
therefore have to show that those states that are usually cited in sup-
port of qualia have inaccurate contents that confl ict with the typical 
behavior of physical objects. If we assume, however, that these kinds 
of states are usually accurate, it follows that the representationalist 
is faced with a different task. The representationalist needs to give an 
account of the contents of these kinds of states that explains how they 
can be accurate. I will give such an account for experiences of afterim-
ages in the next section.
4. A representationalist account of afterimage experiences
In this section, I will briefl y sketch a representationalist account of 
afterimage experiences. My goal is to show that the implicit assump-
tion underlying Block’s and Kind’s arguments in favor of qualia, that 
is, the assumption that viewers can experience visual properties only 
as instantiated either in material objects or in experiences, may not 
be correct. I will assume that Boghossian and Velleman are right in 
saying that genuine experiences of afterimages do not purport to rep-
18 I believe that Sarıhan is aware of the fact that the arguments put forward by 
Block and Kind may presuppose this assumption.
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resent material objects or properties instantiated in material objects. 
The main task for the representationalist then is to explain how it is 
possible for a viewer to be aware of colors and shapes that are instanti-
ated neither in material objects nor in experiences. In the following, I 
propose that afterimage experiences represent a special kind of per-
ceptual object, namely what Martin has called a “pure visible” (Martin 
2012).19 More specifi cally, I suggest that afterimage experiences repre-
sent these pure visibilia as visual disturbances.
My argument proceeds somewhat indirectly. I begin with an analy-
sis of shadow experiences and then consider experiences of afterim-
ages. I argue that both shadow experiences and experiences of after-
images represent pure visibilia.20 But whereas experiences of shadows 
represent their objects as illumination phenomena, experiences of af-
terimages represent their objects as visual disturbances. I would like 
to emphasize that I do not understand the as-locution here in a con-
ceptual sense. In order to see a pure visible as an illumination phe-
nomenon or as a visual disturbance, you do not need to possess the 
relevant concepts. Rather, my claim is that your experience represents 
its content as an illumination phenomenon or a visual disturbance non-
conceptually.
Let me begin with shadow experiences. We experience shadows 
in many different situations. For example, we see shadows when we 
watch a movie that is recorded on celluloid fi lm and projected onto a 
screen. But when we watch movies, we enjoy visual experiences of or-
dinary three-dimensional objects – cars, trees, people, etc. These ex-
periences are not genuine shadow experiences, that is, they are not 
experiences of shadows as shadows. In contrast, suppose that you are 
walking through a snow-covered forest on a sunny day. You see the 
blue shadows of the trees on the smooth white surface of the snow. This 
is a genuine shadow experience. In the following, I will talk only about 
these kinds of shadow experiences.
How do we describe such an experience phenomenologically? I think 
that the following features are uncontroversial. First, you are aware 
of shapes. These shapes have a determinate location – they are on the 
snow. These shapes lack a third dimension – they are genuinely two-
dimensional.21 Moreover, you do not experience these shapes as proper-
ties of the snow. Second, you are aware of the blue color of the shadows. 
But, again, you do not experience the blueness as the color of the snow 
– the snow looks white all over. You also do not experience the color as 
blue light that illuminates the snow. Experientially, the color belongs 
19 See also Phillips (2013).
20 Phillips also argues that shadows are pure visibilia (Phillips 2018).
21 One might object here that shadows are sometimes experienced as three-
dimensional. This is true. For example, we sometimes experience silhouettes as 
three-dimensional. Moreover, moving shadows may imply three-dimensionality. On 
my account, these kinds of experiences are not genuine shadow experiences, but 
rather illusions, much like movies.
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to the shadows. Genuine shadow experiences, we can say, represent 
colored two-dimensional shapes. Note that I use the term “color” here 
to include both chromatic and achromatic colors.
However, this does not exhaust the phenomenology of genuine 
shadow experiences. Even though you do not experience the blue color 
as blue light that illuminates the snow, you nevertheless experience it 
as an illumination phenomenon. The shadowed regions look to you like 
regions that receive less light than the unshadowed regions. This be-
comes clearer if we take the following two phenomenological facts into 
account. First, you see the snow as having the same color in the shad-
owed and the unshadowed regions. Second, you do not see the shadows 
as occluding the surface of the snow. The fi rst fact makes clear that 
genuine shadow experiences involve color constancy. The second fact 
makes clear that this kind of color constancy is not a result of the visual 
system fi lling in the color behind a perceived material occluder, but 
rather an illumination phenomenon. As experienced illumination phe-
nomena, shadows may improve or impede the perception of the visual 
properties of the shadowed regions.22
Martin has argued that we perceive shadows, and many other phe-
nomena, as pure visibilia (Martin 2012).23 He writes:
[T]he visible world seems to contain both purely visual objects together with 
the concrete entities that we suppose are the medium-sized dry goods of the 
material world. We see lights, we see shadows, we see highlights, we see 
rainbows, we see the sky, and we can see mirror images or holograms; all of 
these things seem to be creatures solely of the visual world, nothing about 
them reveals how they would extend into physical space in aspects beyond 
those that we can detect visually. Alongside these purely visual phenomena, 
we see tables and chairs, rocks and sparrows, fi res and hurricanes: enti-
ties which we can single out among visible objects, but which also have an 
existence and an impact well beyond the visible realm. (Martin 2012: 334)
If we assume that visual experiences are states with representational 
content, we can put this as follows. When you see a pure visible, your 
visual experience represents it as having only visible properties. See-
ing a pure visible differs markedly from seeing a material object. When 
you see a material object, say a tree, your experience also represents 
it as having properties that are not visible. You see a tree as a three-
dimensional solid object.
Now, according to the phenomenological description above, shadow 
experiences represent colored two-dimensional shapes that are locat-
ed on surfaces. Since their visible nature is exhausted by their visible 
properties, they are pure visibilia in Martin’s sense.24 I further suggest-
22 It is obvious that shadows often make it more diffi cult to clearly recognize 
the visible properties of objects. But sometimes, when the surrounding light is very 
bright, shadows can have the opposite effect.
23 See also Phillips (2013, 2018).
24 I would like to emphasize that I am not talking about the actual physical 
properties of shadows. Shadowed regions receive less light than the surrounding 
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ed that we perceive shadows also as areas that receive less light than 
the surrounding regions. I therefore think that it is correct to say that 
shadow experiences represent these pure visibilia as illumination phe-
nomena. This claim needs to be understood in the right way. A shadow 
is the result of an object blocking the light from reaching the surface. 
But I do not claim that a shadow experience represents the causal ori-
gin of the shadow. I only claim that such an experience represents the 
shadow as a light phenomenon. I also want to emphasize again that 
this is a non-conceptual representational content.
I will now argue that afterimages also represent pure visibilia. But 
whereas experiences of shadows represent their objects as illumination 
phenomena, experiences of afterimages represent their objects as visu-
al disturbances. To have a concrete case in mind, consider again Kind’s 
scenario in which you experience an afterimage caused by a camera 
fl ash. After the fl ash goes off, you are aware of a patch (Kind says “dot”) 
that has a complex shape and a color that is somewhere between blue 
and gray.25
How do we describe the experience of the patch phenomenological-
ly? The patch has a rather complex phenomenology. I take it that the 
following phenomenal features are widely accepted:
1. The patch has a fuzzy border. This is similar to the borders of 
shadows. It is possible to create very sharp afterimages, but this 
requires very special circumstances. Typical afterimages have 
fuzzy borders.
2. The patch changes in appearance. When seen against a light 
background, the patch looks dark, and when seen against a dark 
background, the patch looks light. Similarly, the patch changes 
its appearance when you close your eyes.
3. The patch does not have a third dimension and it is not possible 
to look at the patch from different points of view.
4. The patch is not on the wall or at some determinate distance 
away from you. Phenomenologically, the patch seems to be fl oat-
ing in front of your eyes and this persists even if you close your 
eyes.
5. The patch moves with your eyes in much the same way in which 
fl oaters move. It is very diffi cult, or even impossible, to focus 
your eyes on the patch and follow its movement.
We can make additional observations, such as the fact that afterim-
ages often seem self-luminous, that they often seem semitransparent, 
regions and have complex physical properties. I suggest only that we perceive 
shadows as pure visibilia.
25 I would also like to emphasize that experiences of afterimages are very varied, 
depending on the specifi c circumstances – the duration of exposure, wavelength and 
intensity of the light, conditions of observation (in darkness or light, with or without 
eye movements, etc.). In the following, I assume that the conclusions from Kind’s 
example generalize to all genuine afterimage experiences.
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that they can be refreshed through blinking, and that they disappear 
over time while changing color. But, for now, it suffi ces to focus on the 
features listed above.
These phenomenal features clearly support the claim that after-
image experiences represent pure visibilia. The patch has colors and 
shapes that are bound together. But these colors and shapes do not 
seem to be instantiated in a material object that has depth, can be 
seen from different points of view, moves independently of the eye, or 
has other properties that are characteristic of material objects, such 
as solidity. The representationalist can therefore plausibly claim that 
afterimage experiences represent pure visibilia.
Unfortunately, these phenomenal features alone do not suffi ce to 
support the second part of the claim, namely that afterimage experi-
ences represent their objects as visual disturbances. One might plausi-
bly argue that you can tell that the afterimage is a visual disturbance 
because of the way in which it moves and changes its appearance. But 
your ability to do so may be the result of a cognitive judgment and may 
thus not require special experiential contents. However, the features 
described above do not exhaust the phenomenology of typical afterim-
age experiences. Let me illustrate this again with Kind’s example.
Suppose again that the camera fl ash goes off and that you see the 
patch fl oating before your eyes. If the afterimage is very intense, you 
will not be able to recognize any visible properties of objects that are lo-
cated in the same direction in your visual fi eld. If the afterimage is less 
intense, you may be able to recognize some, or even all, visible proper-
ties of these objects, but this will be more diffi cult. In both cases, you 
experience the patch as something that impairs your vision. However, 
like in the case of shadows, you do not experience the patch as a mate-
rial object that occludes other objects located behind it, and, in contrast 
to shadows, you do not experience the patch as an illumination phe-
nomenon. I therefore submit that you experience the patch as a visual 
disturbance.26 Here too, I do not claim that the afterimage experience 
represents the causal origin of the afterimage. The experience does not 
represent that the afterimage is a result of certain photochemical pro-
cesses taking place in your retinal cells, for example. Rather, the expe-
rience represents the afterimage just as a visual disturbance.
This concludes my brief sketch of a representationalist account of 
afterimage experiences. In my view, genuine afterimage experiences 
represent pure visibilia (e.g., the patches caused by camera fl ashes) as 
visual disturbances. If this is correct, it is plausible that the phenome-
nology of an afterimage experience is exhausted by its representational 
content. Moreover, since afterimages are in fact visual disturbances, 
genuine afterimage experiences can be accurate. They are not illusory 
26 This is also indicated by the fact that you do not try to improve your vision by 
moving the patch out of the way. Rather, you are tempted to make the afterimage go 
away by blinking or rubbing your eye.
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as Sarıhan suggested. This account of afterimage experiences has two 
consequences that are important for the argument in this paper. First, 
the fact that afterimage experiences represent afterimages as visual 
disturbances accommodates Boghossian and Velleman’s phenomeno-
logical observation that they do not purport to represent material ob-
jects. Second, the account implies that Block and Kind mistake a cer-
tain kind of representational content, namely pure visibilia, for qualia.
5. Conclusion
In sections 1 and 2, I argued that the arguments in favor of the non-
endorsement claim and the confusion claim contain a gap. In order to 
fi ll the gap, Sarıhan would have to show that states of double vision 
and experiences of afterimages have non-veridical contents. However, 
if it is not possible to give such an argument, the representationalist 
needs to give an account of the contents of these kinds of states that 
explains how they can be accurate. In section 3, I sketched such an ac-
count for afterimage experiences, suggesting that they represent pure 
visibilia. If this account is on the right track, it follows that the implicit 
assumption in Block’s and Kind’s arguments, that is, the assumption 
that visual states can represent colors and shapes only as instantiated 
either in material objects or in experiences, is false. It then also follows 
that Block and Kind do not confuse the fact that afterimage experi-
ences are non-endorsed mental states with the fact that they are non-
representational. Rather, they fail to see that we can experience colors 
and shapes as instantiated in pure visibilia.27
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